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Some recent developments in Artificial Intelligence—especially the use of machine learning systems, 
trained on big data sets and deployed in socially significant and ethically weighty contexts—have led 
to a number of calls for “transparency.” This paper explores the epistemological and ethical 
dimensions of that concept, as well as surveying and taxonomising the variety of ways in which it has 
been invoked in recent discussions. Whilst “outward” forms of transparency (concerning the 
relationship between an AI system, its developers, users and the media) may be straightforwardly 
achieved, what I call “functional” transparency about the inner workings of a system is, in many 
cases, much harder to attain. In those situations, I argue that contestability may be a possible, 
acceptable, and useful alternative so that even if we cannot understand how a system came up with a 
particular output, we at least have the means to challenge it. 
 




Alongside, and arguably because of, some of the most recent technical developments in Artificial 
Intelligence, the last few years have seen a growing number of calls for various forms of 
transparency1 within and about the field. For example, the 2019 report from the European 
Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on AI—entitled Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI—
features the notion of transparency prominently, and the European Union’s General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) includes the stipulation that, when a person is subject to an automated decision 
based on their personal information, he or she has “the right to obtain human intervention, to express 
his or her point of view, to obtain an explanation of the decision reached after such assessment and to 
challenge the decision.”2 In part, these calls respond to an epistemic limitation; machine learning 
techniques, together with the use of “Big Data” for training purposes, mean that many AI systems are 
both too complex for a complete understanding, and faster and more powerful than human cognition 
(at least, on the relatively narrow set of tasks for which AI is designed). Of course, in many cases, 
“complete understanding” is neither desired nor required; we are perfectly happy to interact with 
technology by adopting Dennettian3 “intentional” or “design” stances (rather than the more complete 
but cumbersome “physical stance”) so long as the system functions correctly, and the respects in 
which it is not transparent are roughly neutral along ethical, political or commercial dimensions. But 
given that we increasingly and preferentially trust AI systems, and that we do rely on them to make 
decisions, recommendations and predictions in a variety of socially significant and morally weighty 
contexts (for example, not just regarding what video to watch or what product to buy, but also whether 
 
1 Sometimes also discussed under the heading of “explainability,” “explicability” or “understandability” (e.g., by 
Robbins, 2019) or with reference, also, to “accountability,” “intelligibility” and “interpretability” (e.g., in Floridi 
et al, 2018) 
2 General Data Protection Regulation, Recital 71, available at https://gdpr-info.eu/recitals/no-71/ 
3 See Dennett, (1971) 
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a person qualifies for job interview, a loan, or for parole), the call for transparency has acquired an 
ethical (and legal) dimension too. Furthermore, these dimensions intersect: both in the popular media, 
and within specialised technology circles, we find a steady stream of examples and anecdotes of 
problematic biases, prejudices and other errors that have been automated and reinforced—albeit, 
sometimes, unwittingly—because of our reliance on AI systems that we do not fully comprehend. 
 
In this paper, I start by teasing out the epistemic and ethical considerations—and the examples within 
AI—that have led to this contemporary concern for transparency, by asking “Why now?” and “Why 
care?” I go on to note that there are actually several different conceptions of transparency that have 
been both invoked and sought, and I taxonomise and explore their main features. Although the appeal 
of transparency is obvious as a policy objective or an antidote to the problems often described, I argue 
that it is not always possible (or maybe even desirable) especially when it comes to the inner 
workings of such systems. Instead, I tentatively suggest that as an alternative when transparency 
cannot be achieved, the best we can do is to build AI systems so that their outputs can be contested. 
This can take several forms. On the one hand, fortunately, machine learning includes some technical 
tools—in the form of “reinforcement learning”—so that contestability can be included by design in 
the training process of such systems. On the other hand, I argue, we should also pay greater attention 
to contestability as a matter of policy about how AI systems are deployed. This combination would 
mean that that even if, in some cases, we cannot fully understand how an AI system works, the 
possibility of challenging its decisions may still allow us to achieve the ethical goals—such as justice, 
fairness or impartiality—that we value. 
 
2. Transparency: Why now? 
On the epistemic side of the issue, the demand for transparency stems from the intersection of three 
recent developments in computer science, AI, and human-computer interaction: machine learning 
(hereafter “ML”), big data, and the growing reliance on (or even trust in) algorithmic systems to make 
predictions, provide recommendations and take decisions. Let us examine each in turn. 
 
It is useful to think of ML in contrast to classical programming, or what Haugeland (1985) called 
“Good Old Fashioned AI” or GOFAI. In the latter, humans write the programs and provide the input 
data, and the computer applies the former to the latter in order to come up with an output. It is striking 
that this general “input—processing—output” schematic can be applied to such a wide range of tasks, 
whether logico-mathematical calculation, puzzle-solving, chess playing, or dyadic conversation (to 
name just a few of the famous examples). GOFAI is, in a sense, transparent by design, since the 
programs are based on (but therefore also limited by) whatever the human programmers can think up. 
As Robbins (2019) points out, GOFAI systems effectively consist of explicitly coded rules, and so 
transparency amounts to the ability to inspect the code and derive the output: “Opacity with regard to 
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this type of automation would only occur if the institutions doing the automating did not want people 
to know how the decisions are being made” (p. 503) Thus, even if the intended end-user does not 
understand how a program works, the fact that its code was written by a human means that there’s no 
fundamental, in principle, impediment to transparency. ML turns this process on its head, as it were; 
humans provide the data (which may or may not be labelled) and the computer itself comes up with a 
set of rules, or mapping functions, that describe patterns and correlations within that data set. The aim 
is often that those rules can subsequently be used to make predictions or recommendations about 
future or additional data points, because the ML system uncovers patterns that were not already 
apparent. Crucial to the success of ML is the fact that the system itself can modify these rule-like 
mappings (as additional data is acquired or generated) in order to improve accuracy: this is the “L” in 
machine learning. Because the rules track patterns of which we were not previously aware (and thus, 
one of ML’s oft-cited attractions is its ability to facilitate new discoveries) and those rules are 
incrementally modified as more data is added, human developers can quickly lose an understanding of 
how the machine actually works. 
 
In order that ML systems can formulate and update their rules, lots of data is required, and it 
just so happens that we now live in an era where not only is hardware fast and powerful enough to 
process enormous amounts of it, but also human users are willing to provide it for free (indeed, some 
authors, such as Smith (2019, p.52) have even described ML as a post-Big Data technical 
development). The big data revolution is often characterised as an explosion along the dimensions of 
the “three Vs” of velocity, volume and variety: data is being collected faster and faster, in ever-
increasing amounts, and in a bewildering variety of forms (text, images, audio etc.)  And the rise of 
interactive social media and the so-called “Web 2.0”—with billions and billions of tweets, likes, 
shares and search queries—has given rise to extremely large data sets of details about users and their 
connections, on which ML systems can be trained to uncover patterns, associations and trends. When 
coupled with data that is collected and curated for specific purposes as well, the patterns encoded in 
these rapidly expanding sets can subsequently be used to serve up better targeted adverts for products 
you might buy, to recommend music or movies or restaurants you might like, and to make predictions 
about your creditworthiness or likelihood of committing a crime (more on which later). 
 
For now, the epistemic point is that—at the intersection of ML and “big data”—we have built 
automated systems that we don’t fully understand, that are much faster and more powerful than the 
human mind, and which are trained on data sets that are too large for us to comprehend (even with the 
use of conventional tools such as spreadsheets and pocket calculators). Accordingly, a new 
phenomenon has arisen where we see AI experts and tech-sector insiders giving TED talks, and 
writing op-ed pieces with click-bait headlines making reference to “The Dark Secret at the Heart of 
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AI,”4 likening it to alchemy,5 sorcery,6 and various other forms of “black box”7 mystery.8 Of course, it 
is tempting to invoke Arthur C. Clarke’s (1972) famous “third law”—“Any sufficiently advanced 
technology is indistinguishable from magic”—and hope that this sense of scientific awe will dissipate. 
But the calls for transparency that respond to these epistemic limitations become more pressing when 
one notes a third, but somewhat less well-known, recent development in the field of human-computer 
interaction. 
 
Jennifer Logg and colleagues (e.g., Logg, Minson and Moore, 2019) have recently documented a 
phenomenon that they call “algorithm appreciation,” whereby, in a variety of situations, people seem 
to prefer advice when they think it is provided by a computer system, rather than by a human. This 
seems to reverse a tendency (first noted in the 1950s) towards distrust of the output of algorithms in 
comparison to human judgment (dubbed “algorithm aversion” by Dietvorst, Simmons and Massey, 
2015). In a series of experiments, Logg et al. asked participants to make a variety of judgments (e.g., a 
numerical estimate concerning a visual stimulus, and predictions about the popularity of songs, or the 
likelihood of romantic attraction between two individuals) and found that people were significantly 
more likely to adhere to advice about those judgments when they thought it came from an algorithm 
rather than from a person. This seems to demonstrate an increasing willingness to trust automated 
systems, even when we are not sure (or not concerned with) how they work. The many anecdotes of 
people who have ended up driving through fields and into rivers as a result of following the directions 
of a sat-nav or GPS system are testament to this new phenomenon. 
 
The implications of the foregoing considerations should be clear; the fastest moving areas of 
contemporary AI are ones where humans are at an epistemic disadvantage when it comes to 
understanding the systems we have built. At the intersection of machine learning, big data, and 
algorithm appreciation, we have a situation where we don’t fully understand the machines, they’re 
faster, more powerful and more complex than us, but we trust them preferentially nonetheless. If our 
use of such systems were restricted to recommender systems for movies, music and restaurants, this 
might not be such a problem. But the epistemic limitations outlined here start to have much deeper 
 
4 https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/ 








moral consequences when these AI systems are put to use in predicting social outcomes such as job 
performance, criminal recidivism or creditworthiness. 
 
3. Transparency: Why Care? 
Building on the three epistemic concerns outlined above, that there are three similar reasons that 
contribute to the ethical dimension of the call for transparency: the potential for “machine bias,” 
worries about the use of opaque AI in what Floridi et al., (2018) have called “socially significant” 
contexts, and the possibility of perpetuating what Fricker (2007) has described as “epistemic 
injustice.” 
 
One consequence of the way that ML systems are trained is that they can very easily end up, literally, 
encoding more general biases and societal prejudices that are represented in the big data set. One 
notorious recent example concerns the way in which Google Translate handles languages in which the 
third person singular is gender-neutral, such as Turkish, Swahili and Finnish. Until recently, when 
translating from such languages into English, for example, the tool tended to return answers that 
conform to stereotypical gender roles and characteristics (for example, the Turkish “O bir doktor” was 
translated as “he is a doctor”, whereas “O bir hemşire” returned “she is a nurse”; “O bir mühendis” 
was translated as “he is an engineer”, whereas “O bir aşçı” gave “She is a cook”). This has, 
appropriately enough, been dubbed “machine bias” but it’s important to note that it’s not so much that 
the AI system (or even its designer) is biased; rather the repetition of sexist stereotypes arises as an 
unintended artefact of the way in which the system is trained. Google Translate works by learning 
from the patterns found in millions of bilingual texts scraped from the world wide web, and since 
those patterns (“in the wild” as it were) tend to exemplify more general societal patterns, including 
prejudices about gender roles, characteristics and occupations, so the translation engine comes to 
replicate them. 
 
Relatedly, in 2018, a news story broke about similar sexist bias in a recruitment tool that was 
developed by Amazon.9 The goal had been to develop a system that could automatically scan the CVs 
of job applicants and come up with a short-list of candidates that should be hired. But because the 
system was trained on historical data consisting the CVs of many years’ worth of previous applicants 
and employees, the majority of whom were men, the system effectively taught itself to prefer male 
applicants by penalising CVs that contained keywords relating to women. In this case, the problematic 
male-domination of the industry in question was echoed and amplified by the automated recruitment 
process. Again, this example of “machine bias” is not necessarily representative of any explicit 
prejudices of the human designers or recruiters (even if, perhaps, they should have known better); 
 
9 See https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-45809919 
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rather, the system’s undeniably sexist recommendations are an unforeseen (and probably unintended) 
consequence of its training regime. 
 
In both of these cases, it’s important to note that the problem was identified and fixed with human 
intervention: Google Translate now offers multiple translations from gender neutral languages, and 
Amazon has scrapped its automated recruitment tool. This indicates that in some cases where 
transparency is not present, it is important at least that the users of AI systems have a way of 
challenging or contesting automated decisions. I will return to this issue in Section 5 below. The two 
examples mentioned here are not particularly opaque (it is relatively easy to see what went wrong on 
the basis of the training data set in both instances), but as we shall see, in cases where transparency is 
otherwise difficult to achieve, contestability may be the best way to ensure fairness or impartiality. 
 
A more worrying use of ML systems to make morally consequential and socially significant decisions 
comes from the widely discussed “COMPAS” algorithm,10 which assigns a risk score to prisoners 
based on its calculation of the likelihood of recidivism subsequent to release. The system and its 
output scores have been used in several US states, in decisions about bail, sentencing, and parole. The 
superficial appeal of using an automated procedure is clear; it can calculate a score faster than a 
human, it can include a larger number of complex contributory factors, and (so it is claimed) it can do 
all of this in a way that takes the decision out of the hands of humans who may otherwise be guided 
by their own personal biases and instincts. As Marcus and Davis (2019) put it, “the decisions that the 
program is making, being computed ‘algorithmically,’ have an aura of objectivity that impresses 
bureaucrats and company executives and cows the general public.” 
 
The use of COMPAS is understandably controversial, but four particular critiques are of special 
relevance to the present discussion of transparency. First, continuous with the previous examples of 
machine bias, COMPAS appears to display significant racial disparities in its risk assessment, 
possibly as a result of being trained on historical data that implicitly encode the notorious racial 
prejudice in the US criminal justice system. Angwin et al. (2016) found that African Americans were 
almost twice as likely as Caucasians to be labelled by COMPAS as a higher risk despite not in fact 
going on to re-offend, and Caucasians were more likely to be labelled a lower risk compared to 
African Americans, even though they did in fact to go on to commit other crimes. Second, Dressell 
and Farid (2018) have shown that COMPAS is not significantly better in its predictions than untrained 
humans anyway. So not only is COMPAS prejudiced, it’s also not especially accurate. Third, since the 
COMPAS system is owned and developed by a for-profit company, the calculations and proprietary 
 
10 Developed by Northpointe (now renamed Equivant); the acronym stands for “Correctional Offender 
Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions” 
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software used to derive a risk score are considered commercially sensitive trade secrets and therefore 
not publicly disclosed for audit. Finally, although judges in several states are allowed to use COMPAS 
scores to inform their sentencing decisions, in some cases, defendants have not been permitted to 
confront and cross-examine the system in the way that they would if it were a human witness against 
them: whether the use of COMPAS in this way is a violation of due process is a matter still under 
debate. Again, I will return to this last point in section 5, when we consider contestability and the 
possibility of challenging the outputs of AI systems even when they are not transparent. 
 
It’s worth pointing out here that the case of COMPAS also illustrates the importance of transparency 
for the familiar debate concerning an alleged trade-off between fairness and accuracy in predictive AI 
systems. It is widely held that fairness and accuracy are in tension with each other (i.e., that increasing 
one will decrease the other) because, to put it crudely, the demands of fairness might require imposing 
constraints on the set of possible outcomes suggested by the data alone (for example, if one attempts 
to equalise the false-positive rates between two groups of a protected category (such as race)—i.e., to 
ensure fairness of outcome—one may have to ignore or discount other patterns in the data such as 
differential base-rates of recidivism between those two groups.) There is a substantial literature on this 
discussion both in general (see Dutta et al., 2020) and with respect to COMPAS in particular (see 
Kleinberg et al., 2016 and Angwin & Larson, 2016), which I will not go into here. Note, however, that 
in order to make a judgment call about the relative balance we might wish to strike between fairness 
and accuracy, we actually have to know how the system works in the first place. Transparency seems 
to be a requirement for making the trade-off in either direct, In order to know whether we are trading 
fairness for accuracy of a prediction or judgment, we need to know the extent to which a protected 
characteristic (such as race or gender) actually contributes to a decision (e.g., about parole, credit-
worthiness or employability). Again, I will also return to this topic in section 5. 
 
One final consideration brings together the epistemic and ethical concerns about transparency. This is 
the possibility of what Fricker (2007) has called “epistemic injustice,” when somebody is wronged 
“specifically in her capacity as a knower.”11 There are two types of epistemic injustice, according to 
Fricker, and the potential for both of them seems to be present in some computerised diagnostic 
decision support systems (particularly so-called “patient-facing digital symptom checkers”).12  
 
 
11 Fricker (2007), p.20 
12 Here, I have in mind examples such as the “GP at Hand” system developed by Babylon Health, which 
provides some NHS services in the UK. See https://www.gpathand.nhs.uk/ 
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On the one hand is what Fricker calls testimonial injustice where “prejudice causes a hearer to give a 
deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word.”13 This often manifests along depressingly familiar 
prejudicial lines of race, class or gender, and negatively influences credibility judgments simply in 
virtue of the group to which the speaker belongs. There is a risk, with decision “support” systems, that 
although they are officially designed as a tool to enhance professional judgment, they may in fact be 
regarded as replacements for the human decision-makers that they emulate. As Danaher (2019, p.9) 
writes, “Machines are now being designed, built, and implemented to replace, not simply 
complement, their human coworkers.” In the case of medical diagnosis, for example, there is a risk of 
testimonial injustice because, when coupled with the increasing “algorithm appreciation” discussed in 
the previous section, a GP’s opinion may be discounted or rejected simply because the GP is human. 
 
On the other hand is what Fricker calls hermeneutic injustice, where a person is disadvantaged when it 
comes to making sense of their own experiences, or rendering them communicatively intelligible, 
because of a gap in interpretive resources. Taking the case of automated medical diagnosis as an 
example again, a person’s ability to comprehend or communicate the nuances of a set of symptoms or 
health concerns may be too tightly constrained by the requirement that it be reported through the 
tedious connected boxes of a diagnostic flow-chart, or a frustrating hierarchy of pre-programmed 
menu options. Not only does this run the risk of inhibiting a person’s understanding or communication 
of the experience that led them to seek the help of the app in the first place, but it may also negatively 
influence health outcomes (since it is well known that a patient’s active engagement is correlated both 
with better diagnosis and prognosis). 
 
Given the considerations canvassed here, it is hardly surprising that epistemic limitations and their 
ethical consequences have led to calls for greater transparency about contemporary AI systems, both 
as a general scientific goal, and as a policy objective. The fact that we often don’t understand how ML 
systems work, but we rely on them nonetheless in a variety of socially and morally significant 
situations, warrants closer attention. But the kinds of transparency envisaged are just as diverse as the 
specific problems to which they respond. Accordingly, it is important to identify and discuss the 
details of these differences in order to assess the extent to which they are possible, whether they 
resolve the problems to which they respond, and if not, what alternatives might be available. 
 
4. Varieties of Transparency 
It may be convenient to divide the way in which the notion of transparency has been invoked into two 
major categories. One, we can think of as a kind of “outward” transparency, since it concerns the 
relationship between the AI system and things external to it (especially developers, users and the 
 
13 Fricker (2007), p.1 
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media). Here, we may be concerned with transparency about how and why the system was developed, 
or how it is described in both technical and popular presentations, or what the user knows about its 
deployment. The other category, we can think of as a kind of “functional” transparency, since it 
concerns the inner workings of the system itself. Here, we may be concerned with transparency about, 
for instance, how a system came up with a particular judgment or recommendation on a given 
occasion, or how the various factors, in general, are weighted and combined by the system. We need 
not draw the distinction between outward and functional transparency in a particularly strong way—
since, as we have seen, both aspects may be involved in any given example—but it may be a useful 
starting point, and (as I shall argue) it also maps onto the ease with which we can achieve the 
transparency being sought. 
 
On the side of “outward” transparency, the first sub-type operates at a kind of meta-level that has 
recently been invoked in the “values in science” debate. Here, the concern is not so much with 
transparency as a value, but rather with transparency about values. Elliott (2017), for example, 
describes transparency as a condition for the legitimate incorporation of values into science: since 
fact-value entanglements are practically unavoidable in many scientific domains, Elliott writes, “… 
the best we can do is to be transparent about our assumptions so that others can take them into 
account… scientists should strive for transparency about their cognitive attitudes towards theories and 
about the role of values in their descriptions of scientific information.”14 This kind of transparency 
about values may be straightforwardly applied to research and development in the field of AI. 
 
The aforementioned European Commission guidelines for trustworthy AI, for example, make 
reference to outward meta-level transparency. “Explicability” is one of the four fundamental ethical 
principles outlined in the guidelines, and under that heading, explicit reference is made to the fact that 
the purpose of AI systems should be openly communicated and that explanations of “… design 
choices of the system, and the rationale for deploying it, should be available (hence ensuring business 
model transparency).” (p.18). The idea here is that those who develop, deploy (and materially profit 
from) AI systems should be open about the values and motivations that drive them, since these may be 
legitimate factors for consideration by the users of AI systems (or, indeed, those who are subject to 
decisions made by them). 
 
A second kind of outward transparency is predominantly descriptive, and concerns the way in which 
an AI system and its capabilities are communicated or portrayed in the broader societal context 
(especially in popular presentations in the media). It would not be too much of a stretch to say that a 
great deal of hype currently surrounds any announcement of any new breakthrough in AI—partly 
 
14 Elliott, 2017, p.171 
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because it is often closely tied to commercial interests—and both programmers and journalists are 
sometimes guilty of overselling or exaggerating these developments. In October 2019, for example, 
New Scientist magazine tweeted an announcement about an article concerning new research in agent-
based modelling (Lawton, 2019) with the sensationalist exaggerated claim “Predicting the future is 
now possible with powerful new AI simulations that can model every conceivable social interaction” 
(my emphasis).15  Marcus and Davis (2019) have documented a large number of similar cases of 
more-or-less irresponsible presentation and reporting of AI systems in a variety of domains. 
 
So outward descriptive transparency simply amounts to an honest portrayal of what a system can (and 
cannot) actually do. Again, the European Commission guidelines explicitly recommend this kind of 
transparency as a requirement, stating that “… the AI system’s capabilities and limitations should be 
communicated to AI practitioners or end-users in a manner appropriate to the use case at hand. This 
should encompass communication of the AI system’s level of accuracy, as well as its limitations.” 
(p.18) 
 
A related, third, kind of outward transparency concerns the extent to which a user is aware that they 
are dealing with an AI system rather than with a human. Increasingly, some companies use automated 
AI systems—effectively, chatbots—to handle and re-direct initial queries from customers and clients, 
and given their increasing sophistication, it may not always be clear to the user that they are in fact 
interacting with a computer rather than a human customer service representative. The airline Aer 
Lingus, for example, uses a bot to manage initial contact with customers via direct messaging on 
Twitter (asking basic factual questions about one’s booking reference, flight number and dates of 
travel), without announcing that fact unless directly asked, as a kind of triage, before handing the 
conversation over to a human representative. The European Commission guidelines recommend 
against this, in favour of what we might think of as “user-facing outward transparency,” stating (p.18): 
“AI systems should not represent themselves as humans to users; humans have the right to be 
informed that they are interacting with an AI system. This entails that AI systems must be identifiable 
as such.” Similarly, the UK’s Engineering and Physical Sciences and Research Council, in 
collaboration with the Arts and Humanities Research Council, have recently drafted a list of 
“principles of robotics,” Rule 4 of which states: “Robots are manufactured artefacts. They should not 
be designed in a deceptive way to exploit vulnerable users; instead their machine nature should be 
transparent.” (see Boden et al., 2017). 
 
The three types of outward transparency effectively consist of—and can be achieved with—honesty 
about the development, use and deployment of AI systems. By contrast (and perhaps more 
 
15 See here: https://twitter.com/newscientist/status/1180916793126326273   
12 
 
challenging) are several varieties of “functional” transparency that concern, as it were, the inner 
workings of an AI system.16 It is useful to distinguish further between the explainability of a 
particular decision or action taken by an AI system (which we can label “token functional 
transparency”) and the explainability of the AI system in general (which we can label “type functional 
transparency”). It is also worth noting that the type/token distinction in functional transparency also 
has a parallel in the kinds of problematic discrimination or unfairness that I examined earlier, but with 
a significant difference in ease of detection or diagnosis. A bias at the level of types (e.g., in the form 
of general racial discrimination) is at least in principle easier to detect, because it is susceptible to a 
statistical analysis (e.g., of the kind that Angwin et al., 2016, conducted) showing that one protected 
category of people has been treated worse than another. A token discriminatory decision (about an 
individual’s parole eligibility or creditworthiness, for example) is harder to confirm since it can often 
be defended (or explained away) with some plausible argument or other. This point will become 
significant in section 5 when I turn to the question of contestability17. 
 
The distinction between kinds of functional transparency is often glossed over, in practice. For 
example, under the heading of “traceability,” the European Commission guidelines call for both type 
and token functional transparency (p.18), recommending that “The data sets and the processes that 
yield the AI system’s decision, including those of data gathering and data labelling as well as the 
algorithms used, should be documented to the best possible standard to allow for traceability and an 
increase in transparency. This also applies to the decisions made by the AI system.” The focus here is 
especially on how to audit or trace processes when something has gone wrong, or when an error has 
been identified (more on which later), but for now we can illustrate the difference between types of 
functional transparency using an example mentioned earlier. 
 
Consider the use of COMPAS to provide a risk score for an individual seeking to be released on 
parole. On the one hand, the individual under consideration may (legitimately) ask why, on this 
occasion, the system assigned them a risk score of 80%; this would amount to seeking an explanation 
for the system’s particular (token) decision on this particular (token) occasion. Token functional 
transparency would require showing how the system computed the risk rating of 80% on this 
occasion, given the individual’s answers to the 137 standardised questions on which the score is based 
(e.g., “Was one of your parents ever sent to jail or prison?” or “How often have you moved in the last 
 
16 The nascent sub-discipline of “explainable AI” (or xAI) is especially focussed on this kind of transparency. 
17 I thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing this point—about the parallel type/token distinction at the level of 
problematic discrimination—to my attention. 
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twelve months?”)18 On the other hand, the individual may also legitimately ask for a general 
explanation of how the system factors in the various questionnaire answers, and what the relative 
weightings of each category happen to be. Type functional transparency would amount to showing 
how, for example, questionnaire answers in relation to social environment or residence were weighted 
in comparison to questionnaire answers about education or family.19 
 
As I mentioned above, current legislation tends to blur the distinction between type- and token 
functional transparency, and in some cases this is precisely because the two overlap or are intimately 
connected. For example, if one is able to give a satisfactory type-functional explanation of how an AI 
system assigns risk scores in general, then a transparent token-functional explanation (of a particular 
decision) could straightforwardly follow if we know the individual's questionnaire answers. In other 
cases, however, type- and token functional transparency should be kept apart. For example, even if a 
system is not type-functionally transparent (i.e., we don't have a complete explanation of how it 
assigns scores in general), we might still be able to give a token-functional explanation (of a particular 
decision) if we know that an individual scored especially highly on a handful of key measures. 
Similarly, even without considering token-functional explanations, we may wish to focus an ethical 
evaluation of a system at the level of type-functional transparency, by asking, for example, whether 
it's morally legitimate to include factors such as a person's postcode, or educational background. 
These are significant questions that deserve further study: for now, let us note that the distinction 
between type- and token-functional transparency can inform that debate. 
 
Note, however, that because of the epistemic considerations I canvassed in Section 2 (especially 
concerning machine learning with big data) the varieties of functional transparency will be 
significantly harder to achieve that the varieties of outward transparency. We may, at most, be able to 
provide an impressionistic or qualitative account of the underlying calculation or relative weightings, 
constituting something like an incomplete Hempelian explanation sketch: a “more or less vague 
indication of the laws and initial conditions considered as relevant [that] needs ‘filling out’ in order to 
turn into a full-fledged explanation.”20 Of course, on Hempel’s view, such explanation sketches are 
perfectly legitimate parts of scientific enquiry; indeed in everyday or common-sense folk 
psychological prediction and explanation, we are perfectly content with adopting a Dennettian 
intentional stance and making do with partial explanations that are replete with qualifications, hedges 
 
18 See Angwin et al (20116) for more detail and the actual COMPAS questionnaire used, here: 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2702103-Sample-Risk-Assessment-COMPAS-CORE.html 
19 See this recent comic for a similar—if light-hearted—idea of type functional transparency with respect to 
machine learning based hiring algorithms, like that discussed in Section 2: https://xkcd.com/2237/ 
20 Hempel (1965) p.238 
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and ceteris paribus clauses. Other humans are not transparent in the way that is often recommended 
for AI systems, and so demanding full transparency for the latter might simply amount to holding 
them to an unrealistically high standard (see, e.g., Zerilli et al, 2018).  
 
Further, in other cases, we might wish to avoid full functional transparency in decision-making 
systems for at least two reasons. First, if the system’s inner workings become known, bad actors may 
exploit that knowledge to “game” the system. If one knows, for example, that an automated CV-
scanning algorithm has been trained to prefer resumés from people who attended particular 
universities, one could insert the words “Oxford” or “Cambridge” into a CV in invisible white text, to 
cheat the screening process (see Buranyi, 2018). Second, as pointed out by Robbins (2019), part of the 
rationale for using AI to make decisions often stems from the fact that we don’t already know what are 
the relevant considerations in the first place. As I mentioned earlier, one of the strengths of ML is that 
it can discover patterns, of which we were not previously aware, in big data sets; if we already knew 
which considerations should be used, we wouldn’t need ML, and if we insist on ensuring type and 
token functional transparency in building ML systems, there may be no advantage to using them. 
 
The point here is that because of the methods used in contemporary AI, some of the kinds of 
transparency that have been called for—especially type and token functional transparency—are either 
difficult or impossible, or else even undesirable. What alternatives can be found, in these cases? One 
set of possibilities would be simply to forbid the use of opaque systems in morally weighty or socially 
significant contexts, to restrict them to “low stakes” situations where we do not require (or care about) 
transparency (what Scott Robbins has called “boring AI”), or to allow users to “opt out.”21 But there is 
also a further alternative: as hinted above, and as suggested by, for example, Hirsch et al., (2017) and 
Mulligan, Kluttz and Kohli (2019), we could focus on designing and building AI systems where we 
have the possibility of challenging or contesting their (token) outputs. Almada (2019) has coined the 
expression “contestability by design” for this approach to indicate that it should not be a mere 
afterthought, and for the purposes of elucidation, it may be convenient to divide such suggestions into 
two categories; those at the level of policy concerning regulations for the deployment or use of AI 
systems, and those at the level of function concerning how the AI systems actually work. In the final 
section of this paper, I will explore the (albeit tentative) proposal that contestability—either at the 
level of policy, or at the level of technical implementation—may be an adequate possible substitute 
for functional transparency in cases where the latter is not possible. I should note that I do not wish to 
make concrete proposals either for how such AI systems should be designed and built, or for how 
their deployment should be regulated. Rather, my aim here will be to open up space for such a 
 
21 The European Commission guidelines, for example, recommend that  “... the option to decide against this 
interaction, in favour of human interaction should be provided.” (p.18) 
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discussion by showing that even if we cannot fully explain how a system works, contestability seems 
to be an alternative route to enabling the ethical features that we care about (such as fairness, justice, 
impartiality, and so on). 
 
5. Contestability as an alternative to transparency. 
Interestingly, several of the texts that call for transparency also contain a parallel reference to the 
possibility of challenging or disputing the output of an AI system. Indeed, in the above example of the 
COMPAS controversy, the fact that defendants were not permitted to cross-examine the system in the 
same way that they could with a human witness was just as problematic (in virtue of being a violation 
of due process) as COMPAS’s lack of functional transparency. This suggests a possible connection 
between transparency and contestability; indeed the EC guidelines on trustworthy AI connect 
contestability with both outward and functional transparency, stating that the general principle of 
fairness “entails the ability to contest and seek effective redress against decisions made by AI systems 
and the humans operating them. In order to do so, the entity accountable for the decision must be 
identifiable, and the decision-making process should be explicable.” (p.13). Similarly, the EU’s GDPR 
regulations (quoted in Section 1) also stipulate that when an automated decision is made, or 
“profiling” is conducted on the basis of personal data, the individual concerned should be able both 
“to obtain an explanation of the decision reached after such assessment and to challenge the 
decision.” (My emphasis). Strictly, however, transparency is not a requirement for contestability and 
so the two can be decoupled: one need not know exactly how a decision was made in order to 
challenge it as erroneous, unjust or unfair. As a result, I want to suggest (albeit tentatively) that 
contestability may even serve as a reasonable alternative or proxy (or as a way of ensuring fairness), 
when transparency is not possible, and that this kind of contestability could operate both at the level 
of regulatory policy and at the level of technical design and implementation. 
 
There are (at least) three ways in which contestability on non-transparent systems could work. The 
first—at the level of policy, and implicit in the EC and GDPR guidelines—simply involves ensuring 
that there is, as the expression goes, a “human in the loop”: as Almada (2019) puts it, human review 
of automated decision making is seen as an “antidote to error” and human intervention can be seen as 
a harm-preventing form of quality-control. Effectively, this amounts to the recognition (as I 
mentioned before) that many of the AI systems canvassed above are properly regarded as decision-
support systems rather than decision-making systems that are replacements for humans. So, for 
example, rather than the COMPAS algorithm determining a sentencing or parole decision itself, a 
judge or jury should use it as one source of (defeasible) evidence, alongside both their own judgment 




There are, of course, attendant risks with adopting the human-in-the-loop approach as a policy-based 
form of contestability. For example, human review could mean that time-critical systems perform too 
slowly such that a major advantage of ML is lost, or perhaps human intervention could unwittingly 
introduce other biases (e.g., if a parole board, or defendant, is allowed to contest the recommendations 
of COMPAS, the extent to which it is successful will of course depend on the level of accuracy and 
other biases displayed by the parole board and/or the defendant themselves). These concerns are 
reminiscent of the debate concerning the alleged trade-off between fairness and accuracy that I 
discussed earlier, however we should note two further points that may at least give us some prima 
facie reason to pursue the alternative of contestability. First, as noted, although the trade-off between 
fairness and accuracy is a legitimate and serious concern, it is not even possible to make judgment 
calls about that balance without transparency. It is, however, possible to contest the output of a 
decision-making system—on the grounds of either accuracy or fairness—even when it is not 
functionally transparent, so this is one advantage of focussing on contestability for practical purposes. 
Second, for the time being, legislating for this kind of contestability would have the effect of locating 
the responsibility for a decision with the human-in-the-loop, even when the process that gives rise to 
the AI system’s recommendation is not (functionally) transparent.  
 
Further, at the levels of both policy and design/implementation, contestability can be built into the 
development phase of an AI system by seeking feedback from human users both with respect to the 
accuracy of the system and with respect to the various ethical dimensions (such as fairness or justice) 
about which we care. There have already been some studies in the field of human-computer 
interaction (see Binns et al., 2018) concerning the way in which users make such judgments about 
algorithmic systems (and how they compare to similar ethical evaluations of human decision-making). 
And this kind of data (derived from what are effectively focus groups of users) could be used, even in 
cases where the system’s operations are not transparent, to ensure both the development of algorithms 
that are perceived as fair and of more general standards that developers must meet. This is one aspect, 
for example, of the design and testing process described by Hirsch et al (2017), in their development 
of a machine-learning system for psychotherapy. 
 
Third, and importantly, there are technical mechanisms that permit contestability—as a kind of 
feedback loop—in the operation of the very same ML systems where transparency may be difficult to 
achieve. In particular, in ML systems that use reinforcement learning, one can devise a kind of 
“reward” signal and set the system’s goal to maximise it, much like “operant conditioning” in 
behavioural psychology (see Sutton & Barto, 2018). A challenge to the system’s output as the result of 
having it contested could serve as an error signal to the system, indicating that it has made a mistake 
or generated some form of problematic output. So instances where a decision is contested could be 
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coded as negative feedback, in order that the system can update its mapping function and avoid such 
mistakes in the future (see Kaas, 2020, for example).  
 
Many ML systems—including search engines, translation programmes, and recommender systems—
make use of user feedback in order to improve their performance either in general or for a particular 
user. The popular audio streaming service Spotify, for example, has a “radio” function in which it can 
make music recommendations based on a user’s listening history, saved items, and other preferences. 
Suggested songs can then be “liked” or “disliked” and as the user “contests” the suggestions and 
thereby provides feedback, the system learns more about the user’s preferences in order to gradually 
improve the recommendations (similar features may also be found in a variety of other popular 
platforms with built-in recommender systems, such as YouTube, Netflix, Amazon etc.) To be sure, 
what we have learnt from recommender systems for popular entertainment—where user feedback 
obviously makes them more successful—may not straightforwardly carry over to more complex and 
controversial cases like COMPAS. The latter is not only much more morally weighty and socially 
significant, but also (perhaps more importantly) it is adversarial in a way that most current 
recommender systems are not: the state that employs COMPAS to make sentencing recommendations, 
and the defendant thus sentenced, have very different goals. Nonetheless, the model of contestability-
based feedback in recommender systems that use reinforcement learning does provide a limited and 
suggestive illustration of how ML already contains at least the technical tools for implementing 
contestability as a design feature.  
 
Of course, it would be a significant challenge to extend this kind of feedback mechanism, through 
reinforcement learning protocols, to the kinds of ML systems discussed above. It might be too much, 
for example, simply to allow a defendant to give feedback on their COMPAS score (presumably to 
claim that it is too high or too risk-averse). But nonetheless (perhaps in conjunction with the human-
in-the-loop contestability mentioned above) a feedback error signal could encode how often (or by 
how much) the algorithm’s advice is overridden by parole boards or juries, or the frequency and 
distribution of false-positive or false-negative judgments, or whether a loan was successfully paid 
back on time despite predictions to the contrary.22 If this general protocol could be extended to other 
ML systems, it may go some way towards allaying epistemic (and possibly ethical) concerns about a 
lack of transparency.23 We might not know exactly how a system arrived at the decision it made, but 
we would at least have the technical capacity and a variety of ways to challenge its fairness or 
 
22 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for making this suggestion. 
23 Indeed, this is a further strategy that Hirsch et al. (2017) recommend for the design and pilot phase of ML 
systems in the field of mental health diagnostics. They frame it as a mechanism for improving the accuracy of 
such systems, but this use of feedback could clearly also underlie the development of systems that are 
(perceived as) fair or just. 
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accuracy—in conjunction with the other approaches I have suggested—so that contestability is central 
to the development and operation of AI ML systems rather than a mere afterthought. 
  
6. Concluding remarks. 
As we design and build ever more complex AI systems—especially those that use machine learning 
with big data sets—demands for epistemic transparency understandably grow. And the issue becomes 
more pressing given that we seem to preferentially trust and rely on these systems to make predictions 
and decisions in a growing range of socially significant and morally weighty contexts. 
 
But the kinds of transparency that are called for and sought seem to be just as diverse as the examples 
that motivate them, and it may not always be possible (or even desirable) to achieve them all. We do 
need both transparency about values and transparency as a value, but the outward transparency that 
I’ve described above is much easier to provide than functional transparency about the inner workings 
of many AI systems. In the case of the latter, it may be that the best we can do is to design AI systems 
and policies for their deployment—using tools and techniques that are already present within the suite 
of ML resources—whose output can be contested or challenged. This way, even if we don’t fully 
understand how a system makes a prediction, recommendation, or decision, we at least have 
something analogous to a right of reply, or to the due process of cross-examination so that if 
“computer says ‘no’”24 we can reply “Actually, ‘Yes.’”
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